The audit expectation gap is a phenomenon that exists for many years. In particular, the audited financial statements beneficiaries' expectations exceed what auditors can reasonably be expected to accomplish. This paper reviews the extensive body of academic literature which has investigated the audit expectation gap for many years. The focus lies on survey-based research which is the dominating research method applied. The objective is to provide an overview of the existing literature and to summarize its findings and implications. The most frequently identified gaps refer to fraud detection. Education and the expansion of the auditor report are two response strategies often analysed by prior research.
value of auditing and the reputation of auditors and, accordingly, the credibility, earnings potential and prestige associated with the work of auditors (Lee and Ali 2008; Lee et al. 2009a) .
It is the purpose of this paper to review the existing, and extensive, literature on the AEG. The following section provides a general overview on the AEG and defines it, distinguishes its components, mentions typical areas where differences in expectations arise, and discusses causes for and response strategies to the AEG. In the next section an overview on prior research is given and its findings are discussed. A final concluding section discusses implications, mainly for regulators, makes suggestions for future research, and points out limitations of this literature review. Liggio (1974) defined the AEG as the difference between the levels of expected performance as envisioned by both the user of financial statements and the independent accountant. A frequently used definition of the AEG is quite similar: The AEG refers to what the public and financial statement users perceive auditors' responsibilities to be, and what auditors believe their responsibilities to entail (e.g. Jennings et al. 1993; Monroe and Woodliff 1993; McEnroe and Martens 2001; Frank et al. 2001) . Porter (1993) gave a more sophisticated definition of the AEG (Ruhnke and Schmidt (2014) apply a similar definition). According to her, the AEG refers to the difference between society's expectations of the auditor and the financial statement audit, and auditor performance as perceived by society. Thus, there are two major components of the AEG (Figure 1) :
Definition, primary issues, causes and countermeasures
(1) The reasonableness gap, which is the gap between what society expects auditors to achieve (unreasonable expectations) and what they can reasonably be expected to accomplish; and (2) The performance gap, which is the gap between what society can reasonably expect auditors to accomplish and what they are perceived to achieve.
The performance gap can be further subdivided into a gap between the duties which can be reasonably expected of auditors and auditors' existing duties as defined by regulation (deficient standards), and a gap between the expected standard of performance of auditors' existing duties and auditors' perceived actual performance (deficient performance).
Typical areas where differences in expectations arise are (Sweeney 1997 ):
• the role of auditors in fraud cases (Hassink et al. 2009 ), • the belief that an unqualified opinion means that the entity is financially sound, • the idea that the auditor should interpret the financial statements in such a manner that the user could evaluate whether to invest in the entity (McEnroe and Martens 2001), • the provision of an early warning of future insolvency, • the provision of an evaluation of management performance, • the nature and level of assurance provided by the auditor report (Schelluch and Gay 2006) , and • the level of quality in the performance of audits (Humphrey et al. 1992) .
Different underlying explanations have been suggested for the existence of the AEG. In particular, the auditing profession has attributed it to a misperception of audits by users and the public (Lin and Chen 2004) . Users and the public expect too much and remain largely ignorant of the precise nature, purpose and capacities of the audit function ). Tricker (1982) viewed the AEG as the result of a natural time lag. The auditing profession does not identify and respond to continually evolving and expanding public expectations on a timely basis. Other authors argued that the AEG is an outcome of the contradiction of minimum government regulation and the profession's self-regulation, and that the related actions of the profession must be seen in a more self-interested light (e.g. Humphrey et al. 1992; Sikka et al 1992) . Lastly, the AEG is affected by the uncertainty surrounding auditor independence, because the auditor report is worthless if an auditor lacks independence from the client with respect to giving an impartial opinion and independence perceptions vary (Yost 1995; Sikka et al. 1998; Lin and Chen 2004; Salehi et al. 2009; Toumeh et al. 2018) . Independence is a bedrock principle upon which audit quality is based. The fulfilment of the main function of audits, which is to increase trust into financial statements, requires that the auditor acts independently (independence of mind) und expresses an uninfluenced conclusion. Thus, independence is prescribed by laws and by standards (e.g. IESBA, 400.1). A violation of the principle of independence by an auditor represents a deficient performance and thus, potentially causes an AEG. Moreover, auditors must also be perceived as independent by users (independence in appearance; IESBA 400.5). Otherwise they lose confidence in the auditor's work. It may certainly happen that users erroneously perceive the auditor as not independent, e.g. in conjunction with the provision of non-audit services (e.g. Van Liempd et al. 2019) . Such expectations are unreasonable. There are two main response strategies to the AEG, namely a defensive and a constructive approach (Humphrey et al. 1992) . The defensive approach focuses on education and reassuring of the public as to what the auditors recognize as their duties and responsibilities. One specific element of this approach is the expansion of the auditor report, which informs users of what auditors actually do and thereby improves the communication between auditors and users (Hatherly et al. 1991; Koh and Woo 1998; Innes et al. 1997; Mansur and Tangl 2018) . The constructive approach seeks to change audit activities to meet public concern, i.e. to broaden the responsibilities of auditors in areas like fraud or illegal acts, and to strengthen the perceived independence of auditors. Further suggestions include structured audit methodologies and an enhancement of auditors' performance (Koh and Woo 1998; Lee et al. 2009a ).
Analysis of prior literature
We conducted a broad search of the literature with the keyword "expectation gap" combined with "audit" or "auditor". I focused on major auditing (IJA, AJPT, MAJ) and accounting research journals (from the latest journal ranking of the German Academic Association for Business Research 1 ), but also made sure to include more remote sources from a broad Google Scholar and Google search. I then examined the titles and abstracts of promising publications. Additionally, I considered relevant studies in the bibliographies of the identified publications. However, I did not systematically search for working papers and books or book chapters. Surveys are the predominant research method and Table 1 provides an extensive overview on the survey based research on the AEG. I found 88 related articles to be relevant.
It is important to note that Table 1 also includes "grey" literature, i.e. papers published in journals not included in the journal ranking I used. Such research papers are marked with a grey background. On average, the scientific quality of such papers is lower, e.g. due to deficiencies in the application of research method, an incomplete description of the methodology or the fact that they are just replication studies. Nevertheless, their inclusion is necessary to provide a comprehensive overview.
From the survey-based AEG research results I can conclude that the most frequently identified gaps refer to the prevention, the detection and the disclosure of major errors, fraud and illegal acts (e.g. Humphrey et al. 1993; Koh 2000) . Users often do not recognize that the primary responsibility for the prevention and detection of fraud rests with those charged with governance of the entity and the management. The auditor only has a secondary responsibility and has to obtain reasonable assurance that there is no fraud which leads to material misstatements in the financial statements. In addition, the risk that a material misstatement due to fraud remains undetected is greater than the risk that a material misstatement due to error remains undetected. This is because fraud is often accompanied by concealment, override of controls, and collusion, all of which may produce falsified information which may be persuasive to the auditor . Addresses of audit financial statements do not acknowledge such a higher detection risk. Moreover, users and the public have different expectations regarding the assurance level and often assume absolute assurance (e.g. Epstein and Geiger 1994; Enofe et al. 2013) , whereas according to auditing standards the auditor only has to obtain reasonable assurance that there are no material misstatements in the financial statements (ISA 200.11) . Stakeholders also frequently believe that the auditor is responsible for maintaining accounting records and preparing financial statements (e.g. Best et al. 2001; Frank et al. 2001) . Another gap which is often revealed by survey-based research is related to the soundness of the internal controls (e.g. Fadzly and Ahmad 2004; Pourheydari and Abousaiedi 2011). Providers of capital believe that the auditor is responsible for the soundness of the internal control structure of the client company, however, the auditor just has to evaluate the effectiveness of internal controls in preventing or detecting material misstatements on a timely basis. Furthermore, an unqualified audit opinion, which expresses that a company's financial statements are fairly and appropriately presented, is often misinterpreted and viewed as a guarantee for financial health (e.g. Gbadago 2015; Salehi 2016) and for the going concern of the audited entity (e.g. Olagunju and Leyira 2012) . In addition, the audit beneficiaries commonly believe that the auditor reviews management quality (e.g. Beck 1973; Ali et al. 2015) . Finally, research reveals an AEG in conjunction with auditor independence in general (e.g. Schleifer and Shockley 1991; Beattie et al. 1998 ) and the provision of non-audit services in particular (e.g. Haniffa and Hudaib 2007) . Besides these frequently identified areas of the AEG, survey-based research reveals other areas from time to time, like for example the materiality level (Boterenbrood 2017) -users expect a stricter threshold, forecast reliability (Schelluch and Gay 2006 ) -addresses assume that forecasts are reliable, but the auditor can only assess their plausibility, audit scope (Gbadago 2015) -society assumes a complete audit whereas the auditor often works sample-based, or the audit of information outside the financial statements (Bedard et al. 2012 ) -which is not audited, but perceived as such by investors.
Concerning the components of the AEG, prior survey-based research demonstrates that unreasonable expectations and deficient performance are the key drivers, with deficient performance contributing to a much lesser extent (e.g. Porter 1993; Porter et al. 2009; Lee et al. 2010; Salehi 2016; Masoud 2017) .
Two response strategies to the AEG are intensively researched. On the one hand, the AEG prevails where users have little experience and a lack of accounting and auditing related knowledge (De Martinis et al. 2000) . In that regard, a defensive approach may be appropriate. Research findings show that education can reduce, but not eliminate • perceptions about auditor's role in the presence of going concern uncertainties and the nature of the going-concern opinion
• AEG in auditor's role is not wide • awareness of AEG and concern about the scope and responsibilities of the auditor, and the monitoring of auditor's work, and agreement on the potential of increased regulation to narrow the AEG • fund managers who were not qualified accountants were particularly concerned that auditors were not perceived as independent • establishment of an Accountancy Foundation should provide greater independence to the investigation and disciplinary processes the AEG (e.g. Gramling et al. 1996; Pierce and Kilcommins 1996; Siddiqui et al. 2009 ). On the other hand, expanded auditor reports are a frequently researched means. Such research finds that the expansion of auditor reports potentially narrows the existing AEG, but could also cause new gaps (e.g. Hatherly et al. 1991; Monroe and Woodliff 1994; Innes et al. 1997; Leung and Chau 2001; Manson and Zaman 2001; Litjens et al. 2015) . Further strategies dealt with by survey-based research refer to a constructive approach, i.e. regulatory changes (e.g. Beattie et al. 1998) , mainly related to the strengthening of auditor independence (Toumeh et al. 2018 ), e.g. by a mandatory rotation of audit firms or a ban of non-audit services (Ruhnke and Schmidt 2014) , and an improved supervision of the audit profession (Onulaka 2015) . Such regulatory changes potentially improve audit quality, shift auditors' duties towards society's expectations, and thereby narrow the AEG. Beyond surveys, a considerable number of experimental studies on the AEG exists. They also deal with the two predominating response strategies. Education may be an effective approach to narrow the gap (for Australia: Monroe and Woodliff 1993; for Malaysia: Fadzly and Ahmand 2004; for Nigeria: Ihendinihu and Robert 2014), but a positive effect of a revised or expanded auditor report is questionable (for the US: Bailey et al. 1983 ; for the UK and New Zealand: Porter et al. 2009; for Germany: Gold et al. 2012) . Other experimental findings, apart from the Australian study by Gay et al. (1998) all from the US, are that there is a lack of consensus with regard to the materiality threshold (Jennings et al. 1987) , that ambiguous language contributes to the AEG (Kinney and Nelson 1996) , that predictions of the attribution theory apply to the AEG (Arrington et al. 1983) , and that users perceive that review reports provide less assurance than auditor reports (Gay et al. 1998 ). Finally, studies by Anderson et al. (1993; investigate perception differences between auditors and judges. The latter present an important user group, particularly in the US where auditors are exposed to high litigation risk.
Interview-based research on the AEG shows that an AEG exists (Chowdhury and Innes 1998 for Bangladesh), reveals causes for the AEG (Lee et al. 2009b for Malaysia), demonstrates misperceptions on the concept of materiality (Houghton et al. 2011 for Australia), and finds that the adoption of an effective corporate accountability system could narrow the gap (Shbeilat et al. 2017 for Jordan). A US content analysis by Cohen et al. (2017) suggests that the media causes unreasonable expectations.
Discussion of selected papers
In the following, more detailed information on selected articles is provided. Quality and reputation of the journal, recency, and relevance from a European perspective are used as selection criteria. Dewing and Russell (2002) present the results of a postal questionnaire survey. They describe the percep-tions of UK fund managers as to the definition of the AEG, its constituents, and the extent to which the gap might be narrowed by audit regulation. Fund managers are aware of the AEG and are particularly concerned about the scope and responsibilities of the auditor, and monitoring of auditors' work. They perceive a need to strengthen auditor independence, prefer a more frequent rotation of audit engagement partners, and wish to extend the scope and responsibility of auditors in respect of fraud and going concern. The respondents agree that increased regulation offers potential to narrow the AEG, especially as regards monitoring and discipline of auditors. A point of criticism is the fact that the authors just consider the perceptions of one stakeholder group. Fund managers are above-average informed subjects and less informed groups might perceive more and larger gaps.
A survey by Porter et al. (2012a) identifies differences in the AEG in the UK and New Zealand. Participants were from the auditor (audit partner and staff), auditee (internal auditors, financial directors, chief executives and nonexecutive directors) and financial (stockbrokers, financial analysts, bankers involved in corporate lending, auditing and accounting regulators, auditing academics) and non-financial audit beneficiaries (solicitors, financial journalists, general public) interest groups. The questionnaire lists 55 actual and potential responsibilities of auditors identified by reference to law, stock exchange listing rules, professional promulgations, auditing literature and leading audit practitioners. For each, the respondents had to state whether the responsibility is an existing one of auditors, if so, how well it is performed, and whether the responsibility should be a responsibility of auditors. The results show that the composition and structure of the AEG are broadly similar in both countries. The deficient standards and reasonable components contribute most to the AEG in UK, as well as in New Zealand. Unreasonable expectations include e.g. a guarantee that the client is financially sound, the detection and disclosure of minor thefts, detection and disclosure of illegal acts, examination and reporting regarding the client's non-financial controls, or examination and reporting of the client's procedures for identifying financial and operational risks. However, the AEG was nearly 40 % wider in New Zealand. The authors suggest that this difference may be traced to greater awareness of audit issues and more stringent monitoring of the auditing profession in the UK. Porter et al. (2012b) also investigate changes in the AEG. In the UK, widespread discussion of the environmental developments and related audit issues, along with more stringent monitoring of auditors' performance, resulted in a narrowing of the reasonableness and deficient performance gaps. In New Zealand, lacking these factors, these gaps widened. Additionally, changes to auditing standards resulted in some 'reasonably expected' responsibilities becoming actual responsibilities of auditors and, in both countries, the deficient standards gap narrowed. An outstanding advantage of this study is the wide range of issues as well as of stakeholder groups. Unfortunately, however, the researchers do not fully differentiate their findings between the different stakeholder groups.
Based on a questionnaire survey conducted in Germany, Ruhnke and Schmidt (2014) analyze causes of the AEG and the impact of changes to the statutory audit regime. The participants cover an extensive bandwidth of subject groups (auditors, academics, financial journalists, investors, bankers, directors and supervisory board members). The authors reveal exaggerated public expectations, find public's difficulties in assessing auditor performance, but also deficiencies in auditor performance, and demonstrate that auditors are not fully aware of their responsibilities. In particular, the public is unaware of the level of assurance provided by the auditor. Surprisingly, the majority of participants disagrees with the proposition that identifying all instances of fraud is auditor's responsibility. The results also indicate that the public has an exaggerated expectation of auditors performing a management audit. Auditors are not completely familiar with the concept of reasonable assurance. A substantial proportion of external stakeholders believe a lack of independence and the limited information content of the auditor report to be sources of the AEG. Furthermore, the authors show that expanding the auditor reports by information on the achieved assurance level and the sources of material estimation uncertainties can narrow the gap, whereas the impact of a mandatory rotation of audit firms, a prohibition of non-audit services and joint audits is only marginal. This study's findings indicate that the European regulator might have been wrong when further limiting the provision of non-audit services, introducing mandatory rotation of audit firms, and fostering joint audits. However, these results regarding the effect of such regulatory changes have to be interpreted with caution, because perceptions might be different after the implementation of related amendments. Hassink et al. (2009) deal with the AEG concerning the role of auditors in corporate fraud cases. They survey the perceptions of business managers (CFOs, financial controllers, supervisory board members), bankers, and auditors in the Netherlands. The authors find clear evidence of a substantial AEG in the context of fraud, both with respect to auditor performance as well as the auditor's formal obligations. Regarding a performance gap, this study finds that business managers and bankers consider fraud detection significantly stronger a duty of the auditor. Business managers also have higher expectations concerning a further investigation of fraud suspicion. There is an inverse gap related to the situation when the audit client refuses to redress material fraud, i.e. auditors agree more than stakeholders that they then should resign. In contrast, business managers were less sure than auditors that the latter are sufficiently independent to successfully urge audit clients to redress detected fraud. Concerning the standards gap, the authors find that business managers believe more than auditors that even non-material fraud should be reported. Both groups argue that material fraud should be reported to a central governmental reporting agency, whereas standards require such reporting only if the audit client refuses to redress fraud. Business managers also think auditors should report material fraud to society by including it in the auditor report, while auditors themselves are neutral on this issue. Finally, there is moderate agreement among business managers that auditors should resign if they discover non-redressed employee fraud, and all sample groups are in favor of such a reaction in case of management fraud. With regard to the reasonableness gap, business managers have the unreasonable expectation that auditors should detect material fraud, even in the case of collusion, and non-material fraud. In comparison to bankers, business managers are less inclined to judge auditor performance of existing duties as inadequate and see fewer points where auditing standards should be amended. This study confirms very clearly that auditor's responsibility regarding fraud is one of the key areas of the AEG.
In Australia, Houghton et al. (2011) use focus groups and conduct face-to-face office interviews with stakeholders (users of auditor reports, purchasers of audit services, auditors, auditing standard setters, regulators of the market) in the market for audit services. They focus on the issue of materiality judgments and the need for public disclosure of materiality thresholds. Stakeholders perceive that the concept of materiality is not well understood. There is also agreement that more education is needed to improve understanding of the concept, especially in relation to qualitative materiality and to nonprofessional investors. Some interviewees suggest turning to the auditing standards for this education process. With respect to undergraduate auditing education, the authors recommend an earlier introduction of a unit on auditing and that the concept of materiality is brought to the early stages of the course outline. There are mixed views as to whether materiality for the financial statements as a whole should be disclosed, with some feeling that it might be detrimental or dangerous. Interviews provide a source of data richness as the researcher is able to enquire further into the complexity of issues. Such personal interaction, however, restricts the number of interviews that can be conducted within a reasonable time frame. As a consequence, the expressed opinions may not be representative.
An expanded auditor report is an attempt to educate users and to clarify certain matters pertaining to the audit function. Manson and Zaman (2001) investigate the extent to which an expansion of the report can align the views of audit partners, finance directors as preparers and investment analysts and corporate bankers as users about issues communicated by the auditor report, and the extent to which these groups consider that it would be useful for additional matters to be reported upon by the auditor. Their study is based on a questionnaire survey. UK expansions from 1993 had been successful in clarifying the purpose of the audit and the respective responsibilities of auditors and directors. Nevertheless, users do not consid-er the wording to clearly indicate auditors' responsibility for the detection of fraud and illegal acts. Additionally, the auditor report needs to provide more information about the findings of the audit. Finally, users are particularly keen for the auditors to include statements on the going concern status of the client, the extent to which the auditors have examined and relied upon the internal controls, and the materiality level they used.
To test the effectiveness of additional information in the auditor report, provided by the revised ISA 700 which came into force in 2007, Gold et al. (2012) conducted a web-based experiment with German auditors and financial statement users as participants. They read a summary of a firm's financial statements and an auditor report which was either a traditional one or an expanded one with explanations of auditor versus management responsibilities and of the nature, scope and procedures of the audit. The authors find strong evidence for a persistent expectation gap with respect to the auditor's responsibilities. On the other hand, auditors and users reach a reasonable belief consensus regarding management's responsibilities and financial statement reliability. Overall, the expansions of the auditor report do not result in a smaller expectation gap. Thus, the findings suggest that the audit opinion alone may signal sufficient relevant information to users.
A study by Litjens et al. (2015) uses a survey approach with participants from the Netherlands to examine information needs regarding their potential effect on narrowing the AEG. Subjects are bankers, preparers and auditors. The results indicate that bankers require additional information, management is reluctant to let the auditor provide sensitive information and auditors try to minimize their risks. Bankers consider information regarding the entity, such as breaching covenants, quality of controls, and accounting policies, as well as information regarding the audit process, such as audit procedures regarding the going concern of the entity and applied materiality, important. Moreover, only information about the audit process with respect to continuity and the reporting of errors in the financial statements may reduce bankers' AEG. The AEG of managers may be reduced if information regarding fraud is provided. Entity information regarding breaching covenants may reduce auditors' expectation gap. Format changes to the auditor report are not effective. Unfortunately, this study just includes one external stakeholder group, bankers. In particular, the expectations of investors are not investigated.
Conclusion
Research on the AEG is comprehensive, exists for almost 50 years, and covers a broad range of countries. This contradicts assumptions that this research is mainly limited to the UK and New Zealand (Porter 2014; Hay 2020) . However, most of the prior research is performed in Anglo-Saxon countries and in emerging/developing countries from Asia and Africa, like e.g. Iran and Nigeria. There is still a lack of research with regard to Continental European countries.
The AEG exists for a long time and numerous regulatory efforts to narrow it were only partially successful. Research findings suggest that education might be a promising approach. However, the possibilities to implement this proposal are limited, because it seems to be impossible to educate millions of stakeholders. Another promising avenue is the expanded auditor report. The auditor report is the primary means of communication between the auditor and users of financial statements. It is the objective of expansions of the auditor report like the disclosure of key audit matters (KAM) to increase both its information content and its transparency, thereby increasing its information value and leading to the efficiency of capital markets. However, the auditor report loses its usefulness if users misunderstand it, and the disclosure of KAMs may then have the opposite effect. It should also be noted that it potentially narrows the existing gap, e.g. by avoiding unreasonable expectations, but could also create new gaps if the information is not adequately disclosed and understood. Users may e.g. perceive auditors to be responsible for the preparation of financial statements or misinterpret KAMs as qualifications of the auditor opinion. Prior experimental and archival research on KAM analyzes whether the related information is decision-useful for the providers of capital and often fails to find a significant impact (Christensen et al. 2014; Boolaky and Quick 2016; Gutierrez et al. 2018; Lennox et al. 2019; Bédard et al. 2019) . KAM disclosure could also impact auditor liability, however, the direction is unclear (Brasel et al. 2016; Gimbar et al. 2016; Kachelmeier et al. 2017; Backof et al. 2017) . With regard to the AEG a study by Kachelmeier et al. (2019) is of particular interest. It tests the effects of disclosing a KAM, showing that such a disclosure lowers user perceptions of audit assurance and responsibility and thus, narrows the AEG. Therefore, it would be of interest to further analyze the impact of the revised IAASB auditor report standards on the AEG.
A good example for the constructive approach are the regulatory changes regarding auditors' responsibility for fraud detection. Historically, the main auditing objective was the discovery of defalcations. However, the emphasis on fraud detection dissipated over time. Regulators shifted auditors' focus away from fraud detection and determining fairness of the financial statements became the focus. However, recurring major fraudulent accounting scandals resulted in a public perception of misconduct, which in turn caused regulators to increase auditors' responsibility for fraud detection step by step (Chong 2013) . Today, according to ISA 240, the auditor has to obtain reasonable assurance that the financial statements are free from material misstatements, whether caused by fraud or error. However, the standard setter allows a higher detection risk for fraud-based misstatements.
The auditor only has a secondary responsibility and has to obtain reasonable assurance that there is no fraud which lead to material misstatements in the financial statements. In addition, the risk that a material misstatement due to fraud remains undetected is greater than the risk that a material misstatement due to error remains undetected.
Prior research reveals that the AEG differs significantly between countries (Garcia-Benau et al. 1993; Porter and Gowthorpe 2004; Porter et al. 2009; Porter et al. 2012a and 2012b) . Consequently, the AEG problem cannot be solved solely by actions taken by international standard-setters. These must be supplemented by national legislative actions to consider national characteristics. Moreover, what stakeholders expect auditors to achieve varies by subject group (Schleifer and Shockley 1991; Jennings et al. 1993; Hassink et al. 2009; Litjens et al. 2015) . Consequently, this causes a grave problem for regulators, who have to decide to which stakeholder group they should align legislative actions.
This literature review is subject to a specific limitation. Despite an extensive and thorough search, I cannot guarantee completeness. I systematically searched for journal papers but not for working papers and books or book chapters. In addition, my review is limited to pub-lications having the term AEG in the title or the abstract. Furthermore, I only searched for papers written in English. Finally, it was not possible to finalize my Google search (approximately 28 million hits for AEG).
Surveys are the predominant research method. They allow researchers to analyze a broad range of topics. However, participants can easily identify the research objective which in turn increases the risk for biased responses. Therefore, future research should more frequently apply experimental research approaches. In addition, given that the AEG is a very complex phenomenon, and that the previous qualitative research on the AEG is not only limited but also mostly very specific, future research projects could use interview techniques. There is also a lack of cross-country studies. Finally, a promising avenue for future might be investigations regarding the impact of recent regulatory changes, like KAM reporting or stricter regulations regarding the provision of non-audit services, on the AEG.
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Note
1. This list can be found online: https://vhbonline.org/vhb4you/vhb-jourqual/vhb-jourqual-3/gesamtliste. The rankings are quite similar to those from other organizations, like that one from the Australian Business Deans Council.
